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NOTE
JOINT LEGAL CUSTODY: A PARENT'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT IN A
REORGANIZED FAMILY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Historically, the United States Supreme Court has recognized a
parent's constitutional liberty interest in the custody, care, and decision
making in their children.' This right is recognized in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, the Supreme
Court has not expressly addressed whether or not parents have a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in the joint legal custody of
their children upon dissolution of their marriage. A parent's right to
exercise joint legal custody upon termination of the marriage can be
properly inferred from recognizing constitutional doctrine pertaining to
related familial rights Once recognized, states must protect that right by
providing for a rebuttable presumption of joint decision making.
It must first be understood that divorce has become a common
occurrence in the United States. Over one million children are involved
in a divorce every year, with the fastest growing segment involving

1. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder."); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923) ("[L]iberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of
protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation
to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect.").
2. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (stating that a natural parent's liberty
interest in the care, custody, and management of their child is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Lillian Wan, Note, Parents Killing Parents: Creating a Presumption of
Unfitness, 63 ALB. L. REV. 333, 334 (1999) ("The Supreme Court of the United States has
consistently held the right of parents to rear their children as they see fit is a liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
3. See Holly L. Robinson, Joint Custody: ConstitutionalImperatives, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 27,
40 (1985) (arguing that the constitutional right to joint custody "flows clearly from several strands
of constitutional doctrine recognizing related rights").
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parents with young children. This represents a drastic change in the way

our children are being raised today as compared to a generation ago.
This Note recognizes a constitutional right to joint legal custody by
taking a parental rights perspective.6 This Note also recognizes that a
presumption of joint legal custody is consistent with continued
meaningful parenting in a reorganized family.
Part I of this Note will briefly describe the history of custody
evaluations in our society. This section will also define joint custody and
introduce the issues raised in this Note. Part II will present a brief
hypothetical divorce, which will illustrate a fact pattern that the courts

are often faced with. Part III will describe the problem resulting from the
bipolar nature of custody awards when courts are empowered with
discretion to determine what is in the best interests of children, without
due regard to parental rights. The leading child custody cases relating to
joint custody from New York and New Jersey will be examined to
expose their bipolar outcomes to similar fact patterns. Part IV will
examine past determinations of constitutionally protected fundamental

parental rights. This section will also examine the most recent Supreme
Court case in the area of constitutionally protected parental rights,
Troxel v. Granville.7 Part V will be a constitutional analysis of current
child custody philosophy in our nation, using a doctrinal approach to
determine that a rebuttable presumption of joint legal custody is a
constitutionally mandated parental right at the time of divorce. Part VI
will discuss some less restrictive alternatives available to the courts in

4. See Andrew Schepard, The Evolving Judicial,Role in Child Custody Disputes: From Fault
Finder to Conflict Manager to Differential Case Management, 22 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV.
395, 399 (2000) [hereinafter The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody].
5. See id.
6. There is an ongoing scholarly debate over whether or not joint custody is in the best
interests of the child. See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 455, 457-58 (1984) (arguing against a presumption of joint custody); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET
AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 37-38 (1973) (arguing that courts should make a

final determination of custody to the identifiable psychological parent); Andrew Schepard, Taking
Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 687, 694
(1985) (arguing the positive merits of joint custody) [hereinafter Taking Children Seriously];
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAK-UP: How CHILDREN AND
PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980) (arguing that children have psychological relationships with
both parents and would benefit from continuing those relationships); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.09(2)

(2002) (stating that courts should presume that joint decision-making between parents is in the best
interests of the child, unless it is shown that joint decision-making would not be in the best interests
of the child; and the parent opposing joint decision-making carries the burden of showing such is
not in the best interests of the child).
7. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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order to protect parental rights, while also effectuating the best interests
of the child. This section will also present certain situations when joint
custody is not advisable and an award of sole custody is appropriate.
Part VII will conclude this Note.
Under the old common law, there was a paternal preference in child
custody awards.8 The typical custody dispute merely focused on
identifying which parent was the father, and an award to that person was
made accordingly.9 Subsequent to this time, courts shifted to a maternal
preference with the primary objective of identifying the mother so that
an appropriate award of custody could be made to her.' This maternal
preference came to be known as the tender years doctrine, whereby it
was presumed that young children should be placed in the care of the
mother." During the period of time that the tender years doctrine
dominated custodial awards, the courts placed the burden on the father to
prove the mother was unfit if the father was to have any chance of being
awarded custody. 2
The tender years philosophy dominated the courts' decision making
up until the mid-1970s.' 3 Recognizing the constitutional nature of
parental rights, the tender years doctrine was struck down by most courts
as a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it discriminated against fathers.' 4 After this period,
courts abandoned the tender years doctrine for gender-neutral rules and
applied a best interests of the child test. The best interests of the child
standard directs courts to identify which parent, regardless of gender,
best serves the needs of the child. 6 Once identified, that parent is
normally given sole custody of the child, while the other parent is
afforded visitation rights.'7 Visitation preserves a role for the parent in
the child's life, but the visiting parent has no legal authority to make
decisions for the child--other than minor day-to-day decisions while the

8. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 6, at 464.
9. See id. at 465.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 466.
14. See id. at 466 n.49 (citing State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1973)).
15. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 6, at 466.
16. See id.
17. See Taking Children Seriously, supra note 6, at 694 (arguing that visitation will be
ordered to a non-custodial parent so long as that parent meets the minimum standards of abuse and
neglect laws, even over the objection of the custodial parent).
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child is physically in their care.18 This standard, however, fails to
adequately balance the interests of parents in custody determinations. On
the other hand, this standard does recognize that both parents have
rights. 9
Joint custody came into favor as a result of the adoption of the best
interests of the child standard following the abolition of the tender years
doctrine. 0 Joint custody is typically broken down into joint legal custody
and joint physical custody.2 ' Under the joint legal custody model, both
parents share the decision-making authority for major decisions affecting
the children's welfare.22 The joint physical custody model affords both
parents substantial access to the child by almost evenly splitting the
amount of time the child spends with each parent. 23 For purposes of this
Note, joint custody shall refer to the joint legal custody model. However,
this Note shall also presume that the court would also have legal
authority to order joint physical custody as well as joint legal custody of
children.
Joint custody is best when both parents put aside their differences
and work together towards the best interests of the child. 4 The child's
adjustment to the divorce and the reorganization of the family is best
facilitated when the parents set aside their anger towards one another
and work towards a common goal of effectuating what is best for their
children.2 ' The goal of custody legislation is to promote the best interests
of the child.2 6 Courts have increasingly viewed joint custody awards as
the best way to achieve this goal. 27 However, implicit in this view is the
assumption that parents will be able to set aside their differences in order
to effectuate the best interests of the child and in the event differences do
arise, the benefit of joint parental custody and the increased parental
18. See id. at 694-95. Non-custodial parents have a liberty interest in visitation with their
children. See Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 602 (1983). The court analyzed "the
constitutional status of the right of a non-custodial parent and his or her children not to be totally
and permanently prevented from ever seeing one another." Id. The court did not extend its holding
so far as to call the right "fundamental." See id.
19. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 6, at 466.
20. See id. at 469.
21. See id. at 455 n. I (citing Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 65-66 (N.J. 1981)).
22. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 6, at 455.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 455; cf Margaret F. Brinig, Feminism and Child Custody Under Chapter Two of
the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'y 301, 314 (2001). Some scholarly research indicates that joint custody has neither a positive
nor negative effect on the parties. See id.
25. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 6, at 457.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 458.
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interaction with the children will outweigh the potential harm to the
child.2' The first implicit principle can sometimes be problematic
because the court may order joint custody over the veto of one of the
parents. 9 The second implicit principle can also be problematic at times
because some divorces that involve parental difficulties may involve
domestic violence. ° There is increasing data to support a connection
between spousal abuse and child abuse.3' There is also evidence to
support that children are powerfully affected by being exposed to
domestic violence even if they are not the direct victims of the abuse.32
However, not all domestic violence is equal and some courts have taken
steps to consider these cases individually.33 In addition, many courts
have instituted court-ordered parent education programs and mediation
to address some of the implicit problems of court-ordered joint custody.34
These courts proactively work towards facilitating the reorganization of
the family.
While many states now have a presumption of joint custody upon
dissolution of marriage, there are still some states that do not.35 In those
states that do not presume parents will have joint custody upon
dissolution of the marriage, they appear to presume that joint custody is
not in the best interests of the child and therefore will only order joint
custody upon the voluntary and mutual consent of both parents.36
II. THE INHERENT PROBLEM WITH THE SOLE CUSTODY MODEL
Often both parents are fit, and have expressed an interest in
maintaining a meaningful role in their child's life. Unfortunately, at the
time of divorce, parents do not always agree upon the proper division of
parental responsibilities. A brief look at a hypothetical marital
breakdown will expose the true problem.
Harry and Wendy began dating fifteen years ago while in college.
Harry went on to get his master's degree in education, while Wendy
28. See id. at 457.
29. See id.
30. See The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody, supra note 4, at 416.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 420.
34. See id.
35. See Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Resolving
Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 1523, 1538 (1994) (stating that
some states have a presumption of joint custody).
36. See Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1020-22 (N.Y. 1978) (stating that joint
custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative).
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went to medical school. After Harry finished his master's degree and
obtained a teaching position as an elementary school teacher in a local
public school, the couple married. Wendy continued on to finish her
medical training after the two were married. After Wendy completed her
medical training and residency, she joined a small pediatric practice. The
couple decided to have a child, and a year later Wendy gave birth to a
beautiful baby girl, Cindy.
Cindy was perfectly healthy except for a chronic asthma condition
that required her to be closely monitored and treated with medication.
Harry and Wendy both agreed that they would continue working after
Cindy was born, so they hired an au pair to help take care of Cindy
while they were both at work. Harry would usually be the first one home
after work. He would take care of Cindy and also prepare dinner for the
family. Wendy's practice demanded a great deal of time, but she
managed to get home in time for dinner on most nights and also to put
Cindy to bed on most occasions. On weekends, the couple shared
responsibility for the household chores and both spent quality time with
Cindy. Wendy also spent a great deal of time monitoring Cindy's
asthma.
Around the time of Cindy's second birthday, they lost their live-in
help and the couple had difficulty finding suitable care for Cindy. At this
time, Wendy's practice began to thrive and her income was nearly triple
the income that Harry was making at his teaching job. They both
decided that it was in everyone's best interest to have Harry stay home
with Cindy, while Wendy continued to practice medicine and provide
financially for the family.
After quitting his job, Harry took Cindy to early childhood
development classes and picked up a larger responsibility for the
household chores. Two years later, Harry and Wendy enrolled Cindy in
a nursery school that Harry had found. Harry took Cindy to school
everyday and it is there that he met Missy, Cindy's teacher. By the
middle of the school year, Harry and Missy had begun an affair,
Wendy's best friend also had a son in the class and she told Wendy that
she suspected that Harry and Missy were having an affair. Wendy
approached Harry about what her friend had told her, and Harry
admitted to having the affair. He also stated that he was in love with
Missy and was not willing to give up his relationship with her. Wendy
was angry and hurt by her husband's betrayal and contacted a lawyer
about a divorce.
During the negotiations for the divorce, Harry was adamant that
Wendy pay him lifetime maintenance, child support, and at least half of
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the value of her medical practice. He also wanted to continue living in
the house with Cindy and wanted Wendy to continue paying all the bills
on the home after the divorce was final.
The couple, through their lawyers, argued for months over marital
assets and a parenting arrangement. Harry's attorney explained to him
that courts make custody determinations based upon the best interests of
the child. Harry was confident that the court would find him to be the
"primary caregiver" and completely fit. Wendy, on the other hand, was
worried because she had heard that courts award custody to the primary
caregiver and "psychological parent" when one could be identified. She
now regretted the decision she made to continue working and to provide
for the family. Wendy worried about Cindy's health constantly and
wanted to remain an integral part of Cindy's life. She desperately wanted
to participate in the decision making about Cindy's education, and she
wanted to be able to provide medical care to Cindy in the event of an
emergency.
Wendy approached Harry with a joint legal custody arrangement,
whereby each parent would have a voice in Cindy's child-rearing and
control. Harry told Cindy that he thought it would be best if they did not
have joint custody because it would be difficult and awkward to coparent with Wendy in light of all their current disagreements. Harry also
felt it would be unnecessary because Wendy would be allowed to visit
with Cindy every other weekend. He felt that during Wendy's visitation
periods, she would be able to make some decisions regarding Cindy,
albeit minor decisions (i.e., what to eat, what to wear, where to go, etc.).
Wendy did not want to be reduced to a visitor in Cindy's life; she
wanted to remain an active and involved parent. While Harry recognized
Wendy's expertise as a pediatrician, he felt that he could find another
pediatric practice that could take care of Cindy just fine.
In the end, Harry offered to agree to joint legal custody if Wendy
would agree to his financial terms. Harry felt this was an adequate quid
pro quo. Wendy thought Harry was being totally unreasonable, so she
asked her attorney to take their dispute to court.
What is in Cindy's best interest? What will a court do to promote
Cindy's best interest while also protecting Wendy's right to remain an
active participant in the child-rearing and control of Cindy's life? These
are very practical questions that courts are faced with everyday based on
similar circumstances.
In some states with a presumption of joint custody, Harry would
have the burden of showing that an award of joint custody would not be
in Cindy's best interest and Wendy's right to joint custody should yield
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to such a showing. In other states, joint custody would not be an option
because Harry does not agree to it, therefore the court would probably
award sole custody of Cindy to Harry after a routine hearing. The latter
states would justify protecting and balancing Wendy's rights by
allowing her to visit with Cindy.
Il1.

ANALYZING THE POLARIZED OUTCOMES OF CUSTODY MODELS

The Harry and Wendy hypothetical divorce would most likely
result in different custodial determinations based upon the state in which
it would have been adjudicated. While many states now have a
presumption of joint custody upon dissolution of marriage,37 there are
still some states that do not.3" In those states that do not presume parents
will have joint custody upon dissolution of the marriage, they appear to
presume that joint custody is not in the best interests of the child and
therefore will only order joint custody upon the voluntary and mutual
consent of both parents.39 While only ordering joint custody upon the
voluntary mutual consent of both parents, those states will defeat one
parent's desire to have joint custody merely because the other parent
doesn't agree. 40 These states will typically order sole custody because it
is found by that court to be in the best interests of the child.4'
New York is one of the states that have held that joint custody
should not be awarded unless it is voluntarily agreed upon by both
parents. 42 In Braiman v. Braiman, a father sought to modify a divorce
decree that granted custody of the two minor children to the mother.
After the father alleged the mother was unfit, 43 the trial court granted the
father sole custody of the children and the mother appealed." On initial
appeal, the intermediate court45 granted both parents joint custody of the
children. 6 The Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, reversed
37. See Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 71 (N.J. 1981) ("Parental] opposition to joint custody
does not preclude the court from ordering that arrangement.").
38. See Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1020-22 (N.Y. 1978) (stating that joint custody is
encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative).
39. See id.
40. See id. New York courts will order joint custody primarily after both parents voluntarily
agree to such an arrangement. Therefore, one objecting parent can destroy the chances of a joint
custody award. See id.
41. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 6, at 466.
42. See Braiman, 378 N.E.2d at 1020-22.
43. See id. at 1019.
44. See id.
45. New York's intermediate appellate court is broken down into four departments based on
regional jurisdiction. The appeal was taken appropriately to the Second Department.
46. See Braiman, 378 N.E.2d at 1019.
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and remanded the case back to the trial court for a new hearing.47 The
facts in Braiman indicate that the parents were entangled in a bitter
relationship. Both parents accused each other of various vices and
wrongs.48 The mother claimed the father was an abuser, a gambler, and
an inattentive parent. 49 The father, on the other hand, claimed the mother
was a "barfly," sexually promiscuous, and a neglectful mother. ° The
court noted that the evidence and testimony presented by both parents
conflicted and was contradictory. 5' The court, however, went on to note
that the serious cross-accusations demonstrated the parents were
embittered and embattled, therefore a court ordered joint custody award
would only enhance family chaos. 2
- The Braiman court went on to acknowledge that while joint
custody may be in the best interests of the child when parents are
amicable, 53 the court cannot accept that joint custody should be ordered
when the parents are not.54 The court acknowledged that "[d]ivorce
dissolves the family as well as the marriage. 5 5
In the hypothetical divorce of Harry and Wendy, Harry was
unwilling to agree to joint custody unless Wendy acquiesced to Harry's
demands for potentially excessive financial consideration. Because of
Harry's adamant position, if Wendy was to seek judicial intervention in
order to determine a fair distribution of the assets and a fair amount of
maintenance to be paid to Harry, the court would also have to determine
which parent should receive an award of sole custody of Cindy. As a
result, Wendy would need to seek sole custody of her if she is to retain
any legal right to decision making and control.
One can imagine some of the negative allegations Harry might
make: Wendy puts her career before family; Wendy has no time to care
for Cindy; Wendy has little psychological connection to Cindy since he
is the one that takes the time to raise Cindy; Wendy is seeking custody
of Cindy merely to avoid her financial responsibilities; etc. Wendy's
allegations might look something like this: Harry is a cheating letch;
Harry used his child caring time to have an illicit affair with Missy;
Harry has not taken the time to concern himself with Cindy's chronic
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id. at 1021-22.
Seeid. at 1021.
See id. at 1019-21.
See id. at 1020.
See id. at 1019-21.
See id. at 1021.
See id. at 1021-22.
See id.
Id. at 1022.
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asthma condition; Harry doesn't really want custody of Cindy, rather, he
has tried to use Cindy's custody as an extortion tool in order to force
Wendy to pay above and beyond what would have been a fair and
reasonable financial settlement. This is merely a short list of some of the
potential negative arguments that both Harry and Wendy might make in
order to win custody. These allegations could be construed as indicia of
a couple incapable of co-parenting, rather than the emotional and
desperate allegations of parents faced with possible termination of their
legal rights to decision making and control of their child. The conclusion
that Harry and Wendy are incapable of co-parenting would appear to be
flawed; after all, Harry previously agreed to co-parent and share legal
custody of Cindy with Wendy, provided Wendy agreed to his financial
terms.
New Jersey's highest court has also considered the effects of joint
custody on the best interests of the child, and there the court ordered
joint custody over the objection of one of the parents when the parents
were not completely amicable, nor agreeable. In Beck v. Beck,56 the
parents of two children sought a divorce after fourteen years of
marriage. 7 At the trial court level, the substance of the proceedings was
to address equitable distribution, maintenance, and a visitation schedule
for the father with the mother to have sole custody. 8 The trial court, sua
sponte, issued joint custody to the parties without either party requesting
joint custody. 9 In support of the decision to order joint custody, the
court cited the special or unique situation involved in the case. 60 The
court found the parents to be sophisticated people that have adhered to
the visitation schedule that had been in place during the pending
litigation and also found them to be positive towards each other in
regards to the children.6'
Shortly thereafter, the mother moved to amend the order because
she opposed joint custody. 62 They both filed certifications with the father
opposing the mother's motion to amend the order. 63 The father had now
taken the position that he wished to have joint custody. 64 The court

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

432A.2d63 (N.J. 1981).
See id. at 66-67.
See id. at 67.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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ordered a rehearing on the issue of custody and a trial ensued.6 ' At trial,
the father called several expert witnesses from the medical community,
all with psychological backgrounds. 6 The judge met with the children
for the first time. 67 The mother also produced her own experts. 6' Not
surprisingly, the testimony by the experts of the parents varied on each
side. 69 The mother's expert testified that joint custody was not advisable
and characterized it as "hokey" and "very risky."70 The father's expert,
on the other hand, testified that joint custody was advisable because it
would foster the relationship between both parents and have long-term
benefits to the children.7'
Against the express veto of the mother, who claimed that joint
custody was inappropriate because she could not communicate with her
former husband, the trial court reaffirmed its prior findings and ordered
joint custody.72 The court accepted the conclusions from the father's
expert and stated that it was not essential that the parents have an
amicable relationship as long as they are acting in the best interests of
the children and respect each other's legal rights.73
The concept of both parents needing to voluntarily agree on joint
custody is not without problems. Divorce brings about a huge strain on a
couple's relationship and their ability to communicate requires a healing
period before the parents can effectively co-parent.74 In some cases, the
other issues to be resolved at the time of the divorce make it very
difficult for the parents to take anything but an adversarial posture. 75 This
appears to be the case in the hypothetical divorce of Harry and Wendy.
The Beck court recognized that disagreements between parents can be
transitory in nature and should not be assessed in the heat of the
moment.76 That same court recognized that parents do not need to be
friends in order to co-parent effectively; and more recently, some
scholars have suggested that parallel parenting, as opposed to
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
at 68.
See id. at 69.
See id.
See ROBERT H.

MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING To CREATE VALUE

IN DEALS AND DISPUTES 176 (2000).

75. See id.
76. See Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 72 (N.J. 1981) ("Moreover, the potential for cooperation
should not be assessed in the 'emotional heat' of the divorce.").
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cooperative parenting, is often transient and can lead to cooperative
parenting over time. 77
In the case of Harry and Wendy, a court taking the Beck approach
might make an award of joint custody. The court might find that Harry's
allegations, if true, do not negate the possible benefits that Cindy might
receive by maintaining Wendy's legal status as a custodial parent. By
not assessing the animosity that Harry and Wendy are displaying in the
heat of litigation, the court is able to focus on the benefits that Cindy
would receive by having both parents active in her life decisions. The
Beck court approached the award of joint custody, even over the
objection of the primary custodial mother, as being in the children's best
interest.7 8
IV. CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PARENTAL RIGHTS
Whether or not parents have a constitutional right to joint custody
of their children upon dissolution of the marriage is a question the
Supreme Court of the United States has not yet addressed. The Supreme
Court has continually held that parents have a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in the custody, care, and decision making of their
children.79 The Court has further held that the right of families, even
extended families, to live together is a liberty interest protected by the
Constitution. 8° In defining familial rights, the Supreme Court has ruled
that individuals have fundamental rights to marry,8 even when in
prison," to choose who they can marry, 3 to choose whether or not to
have children, 84 to abort unwanted pregnancies," to decide upon the
education of their children,"6 to decide who visits with their children,8"
and to decide to divorce." While the Court has spoken on a wide variety
of family issues and recognized many fundamental personal and family
rights, the Court has not yet addressed whether or not parents have a
77. See id.; see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 292 (1992).
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
390, 399
87.
88.

See Beck, 432 A.2d at 72.
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978).
See Turner v. Salley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987).
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
(1923).
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382 (1971).
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fundamental liberty interest in maintaining legal custody of their
children upon divorce. The Court has held that "government cannot treat
the parent-child relationship as automatically less significant simply
because the parents are unwed .. . .""Some commentators have opined,
however, that when the divorce is final and a parent is awarded custody,
that parent's right to custody of their children is fundamental and
"cannot be terminated without some showing of unfitness, even if the
child's interests might be furthered by termination." 90
The first level of analysis when challenging a state's interference
with parental rights involves establishing whether or not the infringed
parental right is fundamental. Once a right or liberty interest is deemed
to be fundamental, the burden of persuasion9' shifts to the state and the
law will92stand only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.
The Supreme Court has varied on the terminology it uses to
describe rights in family matters. In the past decade, in the abortion area,
the Court has moved away from the use of the term "fundamental" and
shifted the burden of persuasion to the party challenging the state
interference to show "undue burden" on the exercise of the liberty
interest. 93 And in the "right to die" area, the Court has also refused to
refer to this right as fundamental and essentially applied an intermediate
level of scrutiny .9 However, in 2000, the Supreme Court in Troxel v.
Granville reaffirmed the fundamental nature of parental rights. 95

89.

LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-20, at 1416 (2d ed. 1988);

see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972).
90. IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 1346 (3d ed. 1998).
91. See infra Part V.
92. See Recent Decision, Washington County Department of Social Services v. Clark-The
Constitutionality of a Rebuttable Presumption in a ParentalRights Termination Case, 43 MD. L.
REV. 632, 638 (1984) (stating that the state carries the burden of persuasion when a presumption
infringes on a constitutionally protected liberty interest); see also Lois Shepherd, Looking Forward
with the Right of Privacy, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 251, 263 (2001) (stating that once a right is
determined to be fundamental, it would require a showing of a compelling state interest that is
narrowly tailored); cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (holding that the right
to assisted suicide is not a fundamental liberty interest and therefore the government need only show
that the intrusion on this right is rationally related to a legitimate government interest).
93. See Shepherd, supra note 92, at 263 (analyzing the Supreme Court's refusal to refer to the
abortion right as fundamental); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 834 (1992)
(avoiding the use of the term fundamental when referring to the liberty interest at stake).
94. See also Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (holding that
the right to die is a liberty interest).
95. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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PastDeterminationsof FundamentalRights Within the Family

In the historical case, Meyer v. Nebraska,96 the Supreme Court
established the parent's constitutional right to raise and control the
upbringing of their children. The Court held a Nebraska state statute,
making it a crime to teach a foreign language to children who have not
finished the eighth grade, was arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore
infringed upon the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 97
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 98 In
analyzing this amendment, the Court noted that the amendment denotes
various liberty interests including but not limited to the right to marry,
and establish a home and bring up children. 99 The Court noted that the
established doctrine applicable to an analysis of a state statute is "that
this liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the
public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without
reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State
to effect."''t The Supreme Court held that a parent's right to engage a
teacher to teach their children was within the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment and could not be overcome by such an arbitrary
statute.0 '
Two years after the Meyer decision, in 1925, the Court decided
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, °2 wherein the Court, relying on Meyer,
struck down a state law requiring children to attend public school, which
0 °3
deprived parents of their right to send their children to private school.
The Court recognized that children are "not the mere creature of the
State."' 4
While both Meyer and Pierce were decided during a time when the
Court was willing to expand substantive due process, much of that
expansion has subsequently been repudiated.' 5 Meyer and Pierce,
96. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
97. See id.
at 399.
98. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
99. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
100. Id. at 399-400.
101. See id. at 400.
102. 268 U.S. 510 (1925)
103. See id. at 534-35.
104. See id. at 535.
105. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905); see David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy
After Troxel and Carhart,48 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2001) ("[Tlhe Court has repudiated the
interventionism of the Lochner era, it has clung to the narrow sliver of its Lochner-era precedents
relating to parents and children.").
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however, have been cited in many cases since this time, and they were
recently cited to support the fundamental nature of parent rights in
Troxel.'06
This parental right to control the education and upbringing of their
children is by no means absolute. 7 In Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court held that a putative father must demonstrate his willingness to
assume responsibility for his children, but when he does, it "undeniably
warrants deference" to his rights.' 8 A parent's interest or right to
"companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children,"
is a substantial right.' °9 Absent some powerful countervailing interest,
this right requires protection."0 The countervailing interest must be
weighed against the loss the parent would suffer as a result of the
infringement on his or her fundamental right."' The private interest of a
parent's right to custody is a commanding interest that would require
clear and convincing proof of a parent's unfitness in order to terminate
parental rights." 2
Upon the dissolution of the marriage, the parents effectively
terminate the traditional nuclear family living arrangements. They do not
necessarily terminate the family. The Supreme Court has recognized that
while the nuclear family is one ideal of American families, the right of
family extends beyond the traditional nuclear family.' In Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, the Court struck down a zoning ordinance that
determined which family members were allowed to live in a
household.' " The ordinance in question did not allow for some extended
family members to reside in the same household." 5 The Moore Court
stated that the Constitution protects the sanctity of family because it is
deeply rooted in our tradition. ' 6 In an apparent recognition of the various
familial models in our society, the Court went further to state that our
traditions are not limited to the bonds of the nuclear family."1 7 Along
106. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
107. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (stating that a natural father has the right
to accept responsibility of his children, and if he fails to do so, the Constitution does not compel a
state to listen to his opinions regarding the best interests of his children).
108. 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758 (1982).
112. See id. at 747-48.
113. See Moore v. City of E.Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
114. See id.
115. See id. at 496.
116. See id. at 503.
117. See id. at 504.
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those lines, our society has experienced an acceptance for models of
family that may not mirror the nuclear family.
Divorce has become a common occurrence in our society. Nearly
half of all American marriages will end in divorce. ' 8 The vast majority
of these families experiencing divorce have children." 9 As a direct result
of divorce, families reorganize and take on a new model distinct from
the nuclear family (i.e., single parent homes, parent and child
cohabitating with extended family for needed support)'2 ° that would be
protected by the rights recognized in Moore.
Once divorced, a single custodial parent is protected from a state's
interference with their right to custody and control of their children. A
state may not intrude upon that relationship and terminate it without a
showing of unfitness, usually entailing abuse or neglect, by clear and
convincing evidence. '
The level of a parent's fundamental constitutional rights at the time
of divorce is at stake in this analysis of a parent's constitutional right to
joint custody. In states where there is no presumption of joint custody,
the states delegate to the parents the responsibility of voluntarily
agreeing to joint custody.' 2 Or, in the absence of a voluntary agreement,
the state will choose which parent shall make all the decisions for the
child, while also determining which parent shall have their right to care
and decision making terminated.'23 As support for this action, the state
invokes its responsibility and right as parens patriae to champion the
best interests of the child.'24 The state invokes this right even as against-a
natural parent that has established the necessary bond that the Stanley
Court held would justify constitutional protection of the fundamental
liberty interest in the custody, care, and decision making of their child.'25
The Stanley Court determined that while procedural due process entitles
an unwed father to a hearing to allow the father to rebut a presumption
of unfitness, it also recognizes that a degree of substantive due process is
required as well. 2 6 The degree of substantive due process required before

118. See The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody, supra note 4, at 399.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 396.
121. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982).
122. See Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 591 (1978).
123. See id.
124. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 ("As parens patriae, the State's goal is to provide the child
with a permanent home.").
125. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (holding that procedural due process
requires that an unwed father be given a hearing to rebut a presumption of unfitness).
126. See id.
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563

a state can intervene and terminate their legal right to decision making
and control over their children remains an area that the Court has not yet
addressed. The Court, in 2000, decided that some degree of substantive
a state can intrude upon at least one aspect
due process is required before
21
making.
decision
of parental
B.

The Latest Reaffirmance of the FundamentalNature of Parental
Rights

Recently, the United States Supreme Court decided a case in the
area of a parent's right to choose who may visit with their children.' 21 In
Troxel v. Granville, the Court, in a plurality opinion, held that a
Washington State grandparent visitation statute was unconstitutional as
applied to the facts of the case.2 9 However, the Court was deeply divided
over the rights of parents and the nature of the parent-child
relationship. 30
The Washington statute at issue allowed "'any person' to petition a
superior court for visitation rights 'at any time"' and also authorized a
court to grant such visitation when it is found to be in "the best interest
of the child."' 3 ' Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel, who had never
married, conceived two children together, Isabelle and Natalie.12 Brad
subsequently committed suicide. 133 Prior to Brad committing suicide, he
separated from Tommie and lived with his parents. 3 4 He regularly
brought the children to his parent's home and exercised weekend
visitation."' After Brad's death, Tommie informed Brad's parents that
she wished to shorten the amount of visitation that Brad's parents had
been exercising 1 6 to one short visit per month,'37 which would not
include an overnight.'3 8 The grandparents petitioned the court for a more
extensive visitation to include two weekends a month.' 39 Tommie did not
127. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
128. See id.
129. See id. at 75.
130.

See Andrew Schepard, Muddled Impact of the High Court's Grandparent Visitation

Decision, N.Y.L.J., July 13, 2000, at 3 [hereinafter Muddled Impact of the High Court's
GrandparentVisitation Decision].
131. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 60-61.
137. See id. at 61.
138. See id.
139. See id.
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oppose any visitation; rather, she wished to grant40 the grandparents only
the shorter visitation schedule that she proposed.'
The Washington State Superior Court, the state's trial level court,
ordered visitation to the petitioning grandparents, "one weekend per
month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both of the
petitioning grandparents' birthdays." '' 4' Tommie Granville appealed the
order and the Washington Court of Appeals remanded the case back to
the superior court for findings of fact and conclusions of law.'4 2 The
superior court subsequently found that the ordered visitation was in the
best interests of the children. 43 The superior court found the Troxels to
be a loving family, all located within the vicinity and capable of
providing opportunities for emotional support and life enrichment that
would be in the best interests of the children.'"
Tommie Granville appealed the order and Washington's
intermediate appellate court dismissed the Troxels' petition by focusing
on the grandparents' lack of standing to petition for visitation unless
there was a custody action pending.' 45 The Troxels petitioned the
Washington Supreme Court for review and the court disagreed with the
appellate court on the standing issue but nevertheless affirmed the
decision by concluding that the Washington statute unconstitutionally46
infringed upon the parent's fundamental right to rear their children.'
The Washington Supreme Court held that the statute in question
permitted the state to intrude upon, and interfere with, the parent's right4
to raise their children, without any showing of harm to the children.' 1
The statute also allowed a court to order visitation with any third party,
over objection of the parents, solely because it was in the best interests
of the child.' 48 The court stated that the best interests of the child
standard was "insufficient to serve as a compelling state interest
overruling a parent's fundamental rights.' 49
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed
the Washington decision.'50 A divided Supreme Court issued a plurality
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 61-62.
145. See id. at 62.
146. See id. at 63.
147. See In re Custody of Smith, 969 P.2d 21, 30 (Wash. 1998) (consolidating three distinct
visitation cases including In re Visitation of Troxel).
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
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opinion with three Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer) joining in the opinion by Justice O'Connor. 5 '
Justices Thomas and Souter filed concurring opinions, and Justices
Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy dissented.' The plurality opinion
reaffirmed the existence of a parent's constitutional right and went
further to state that "the interest of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children-is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by [the] Court."'53 The plurality opinion
made clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has a
substantive component that requires heightened protection against
governmental interference with fundamental rights and liberty
interests. 54 The opinion, however, does not go on to state the appropriate
level of scrutiny that courts should apply in assessing claims of
infringement upon this constitutional right.'" Rather, as Justice Thomas
points out in his concurring opinion, the Court "curiously" declined to
provide the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to such
fundamental rights.'56 Instead, the Court declared the statute
unconstitutional "as applied" because it was "breathtakingly broad" and
did not afford the parent's decision any deference.' 5
Presumably, the Court declared the statute unconstitutional "as
applied" in order to avoid declaring the statute facially
unconstitutional.'58 Since most state court determinations in this area are
determined on a case-by-case basis, the Court avoided the need to
rewrite state grandparent laws across the nation by deciding exactly what
would trigger a state's statute unconstitutional "as a per se matter.' 59 By
deciding the case at bar on an "as applied" basis, the Court is able to
avoid formulating a rule of constitutional law broader than required by
the facts in the case. 6 ° The plurality concluded that the effect of the
151. See id. at 60.
152. See id. at 75, 80, 91, 93.
153. Id. at 65.
154. See id.
155. See Muddled Impact of the High Court's Grandparent Visitation Decision, supra note
130, at 4.
156. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80.
157. See id. at 67.
158. See Muddled Impact of the High Court's Grandparent Visitation Decision, supra note 130
at 4.
159. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
160. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (recalling two cardinal
rules of federal courts: "'[one], never to anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the
necessity of deciding it; the other never to formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied') (quoting United States v. Raines, 362
U.S. 17, 21 (1960)).
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Washington statute was to empower a court to disregard and overturn
any decision by a fit custodial parent regarding a third party seeking
visitation with their children based solely on the best interests of the
child. The Court went on to state that that the facts of the case indicated
that the original court order was based on a mere disagreement and was
not founded on any special factors that might justify a state interfering
with the fundamental right of parents to make child-rearing decisions. 6'
Justice Souter's concurring opinion stated that he would strike the
statute down on its face., 62 He thought that this would be consistent with
the Court's prior cases that addressed similar substantive issues.' 63 He
noted that in the history of cases decided by the Supreme Court, the
Court has not determined the "exact metes and bounds to the protected
interest" of the parent-child relationship.' 64 Upon reaffirming his support
for the constitutional right of parents in the nurture, upbringing,
companionship, care, and custody of children, he concurred with the
decision of the plurality opinion of the court, without stating an
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. 65 Justice Thomas' concurring
opinion was less ambiguous regarding what he believed to be the
appropriate level of scrutiny. 66 After agreeing with the plurality that a
fundamental liberty interest was at stake, he concluded that "strict
scrutiny" was the 16appropriate
level of protection to be afforded to
7
fundamental rights.
While grandparent visitation was at issue in Troxel, the case is most
noteworthy for the Court's decision to reaffirm the fundamental nature
of a parent's liberty interest in the custody, care, and control of their
children.16 It is also important to note that the Court recognized due
process does not just mean 'fair process,"' but involves a substantive
component requiring 'heightened protection against government
interference."' 6 9 Unfortunately, as Justice Thomas points out, the Court
failed to provide us with the appropriate standard of review, or even the
meaning of "heightened protection.' 70
161. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68 (stating that the Washington Superior Court's order was based
on a mere disagreement and not on special factors justifying the state's interference with Mrs.
Granville's fundamental liberty rights).
162. See id. at 75.
163. See id.
164. Id. at 78.
165. See id. at 79.
166. See id. at 80.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 65.
169. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997)).
170. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80.
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Simplistically, there are three levels of scrutiny: Rational basis,
intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Rational basis scrutiny is
usually upheld when the law bears a reasonable relationship to the
attainment of some legitimate governmental objective. 7 ' Strict scrutiny
is the highest level of scrutiny and is normally satisfied only when a
state has a compelling interest that justifies the interference and the law
is necessary because there are no less restrictive alternatives.'72
Intermediate scrutiny lies between the two extremes of rational basis
scrutiny and strict scrutiny.'73 Intermediate scrutiny has been defined as
requiring the legislation to be "substantially related to the achievement
of an important government
objective," and is sometimes referred to as
4
heightened scrutiny.1
The use of the term "fundamental" normally ensures that strict
scrutiny is the appropriate level of review."' In 1997, the Supreme Court
decided Washington v. Glucksberg, wherein Justice Souter's concurring
opinion stated that the use of "precision in terminology" required
reserving the term "right" for those instances in which a liberty interest
trumps a governmental countervailing interest.176 In Glucksberg, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated that extending
constitutional protection to liberty interests places the issue "outside the
arena of public debate and legislative action."' 77
However, in spite of the Court's use of the term "fundamental" and
"right," it is apparent that the Troxel plurality was unwilling to articulate
a strict scrutiny standard of review for a parent's right to control a
child's upbringing. This Court's unwillingness to articulate strict
scrutiny might also be construed as an implicit rejection of strict scrutiny
in this context.' In any event, it is clear that this Court held this liberty
interest to some heightened scrutiny."' 9 In the opinion of Justice Thomas,
the Washington statute at issue failed to meet a legitimate state interest,
no less a compelling state interest, indicating his belief that this statute

171. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (7th ed. 1999).
172. See id. at 1435.
173. See id. at 820.
174. Id.
175. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 762 (Souter, J., concurring).
176. See id. at 768-69 n.10.
177. Id. at 720.
178. See Meyer, supra note 105, at 1152 (stating that the majority of Justices in Troxel v.
Granville implicitly rejected strict scrutiny).
179. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
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would have been found unconstitutional even under an intermediate
scrutiny standard. 8 °
V. DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
An examination of prior constitutional doctrine may help to
determine whether or not a state's policy of primarily ordering joint
custody only upon the voluntary consent of both parents is
constitutionally permissible. This analysis is not intended to suggest that
any one doctrine is dispositive on the issue. Rather, it is intended to
explore the constitutional limitations on a state's interference with
parental rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
When a state presumes that joint custody should be awarded only
upon the voluntary agreement of the parents, the state has in essence
delegated a veto power to one of the parents. 8 ' Once a spouse has
exercised the power to veto joint custody, the court then presumes that
joint custody is not in the best interests of the child.'8 2 This presumption
is irrebuttable by either parent when the state predetermines that joint
custody will only be awarded as a voluntary alternative. 8 8 At the time of
the hearing, the court will not even attempt to balance the competing
rights of parents. Instead, the court will merely seek to determine which
parent best serves the children's needs in order to award sole custody to
that parent."'
In Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth, the Court held that a spousal
notification requirement before a woman could obtain an abortion
constituted an unconstitutional veto power delegated by the state.'85
While the provision was not an express veto, the Court determined that it
operated as a veto, which could be exercised without any justification.
The Court held that the state could not delegate, to a spouse, a veto
power, which the state itself could not exercise."' The Court went on to
acknowledge that the marital couple is an entity made up of two
individuals, each with privacy rights to be free from unwarranted
180. See id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he State of Washington lacks even a legitimate
governmental interest-to say nothing of a compelling one-in second-guessing a fit parent's
decision regarding visitation with third parties. On this basis, I would affirm the judgment below.").
181. See Taking Children Seriously, supra note 6, at 714 n. 113.
182. See Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1020-22 (N.Y. 1978).
183. See id. at 1020.
184. See id. at 1021.
185. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). The Court also rejected an
absolute parental veto over a minor child's abortion. See id. at 74.
186. See id. at 71.
187. See id. at 69.
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governmental intrusion into the decision whether to bear or beget
children.'88 The Court also recognized the competing interests of the
spouses, and favored balancing these rights. Since the woman is the one
to bear the child and she is the one immediately
affected by the
189
favor.,
her
in
weighs
balance
"the
pregnancy,
While it is conceivable to argue that the "no veto"
principle in
Danforth stands for an "abortion only" doctrine, Professor Laurence
Tribe asserts that the holding in Danforth can be synthesized with the
holding in Stanley,'9 and other relevant family rights cases, to draw the
conclusion that "the stereotypical 'family unit' that is so much a part of
our constitutional rhetoric is becoming decreasingly central to our
constitutional reality."' 9' As the Danforth Court recognized, parents have
individual rights that warrant protection.' 92
In the context of joint custody, both parents may be fit and
extremely involved in the care and control of their children at the point
in time when the state would require each parent to consent to joint
custody. A parent's refusal to consent to such an arrangement is an
actual veto power, which guarantees that one of the parents will have
their legal rights to custody and control of their children terminated by
the state. 193 The state delegates this veto power to the parents while they
are still married, but they are negotiating their affairs for an upcoming
divorce.' 94 Presumably, the parent most likely to be designated sole
custodian has the state-delegated authority to "hold up" the other parent
for more favorable financial concessions by bargaining custody rights
for monetary consideration.' 95
In the hypothetical divorce discussed in Part II, Harry possessed the
power to "hold up" Wendy, because he was confident that he would be
awarded sole custody if a court had to choose between them. Therefore
Wendy was given an ultimatum-she must agree to his financial terms
in order to maintain her custodial status. This problem might be
prevented if the law would presume joint custody in the absence of some

188. Seeid.at70n.ll.
189. Id. at 71.
190. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that father cannot automatically be
presumed unfit).
191. TRIBE, supra note 89, § 15-20, at 1416-17.
192. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 70.
193. See Taking Children Seriously, supra note 6, at 714 n. 113.
194. See id. at 715.
195. See id.; see also Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent On Joint Custody, 47
MD. L. REV. 497, 511-12 (1987) (arguing against a presumption of joint custody because it fails to
consider the woman's financial bargaining position).
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showing of unfitness or detriment to the child; therefore, parents would
have less incentive to oppose joint custody and theoretically,
fewer
96
parents would have their legal rights to custody terminated. 1
The underpinnings of the "no veto" principle in Danforth are that
the state cannot delegate more power than it possesses. 97 Therefore, it
can be logically inferred that the burden the state carries 198 in order to
terminate parental rights would be implicit in any delegation of the
power to terminate parental rights.' 99 But, parents are not required to
present any reasons for rejecting joint custody, nor are they required to
show "any" special factors that might warrant the conclusion that joint
custody is not in the best interests of the child.2°° The question remains,
where did the burden go when the state delegated its power? As
justification for terminating the parental rights of one of the parents, the
state asserts that the parents' inability to agree to joint custody is
evidence of an inability to co-parent and effectuate the best interests of
the children, in turn necessitating an award of sole custody. 2°1 This
reasoning, however, seems circular at best. The parent seeking to defeat
the other parent's right to custody of the child may choose to do so for
absolutely no reason if they wish. The draconian result of a parent losing
their right to custody and control of their children is a foregone
conclusion before the court has even intervened.
The state's position that joint custody is only appropriate as a
voluntary agreement between parents creates an irrebuttable
presumption that sole custody is in the best interests of the child when
2022
parents seek judicial intervention. Whether or not the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine is an appropriate remedy for this constitutional
question
requires
a• threshold
determination that at least intermediate
scruiny
s
201
scrutiny is appropriate. Considering the most recent Supreme Court
decision involving parental rights, the Troxel decision made it apparent
that "heightened protection" was warranted to protect a parent's right to
decide who may visit with their children. For purposes of this Note,
196. See Taking Children Seriously, supra note 6, at 716.
197. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 52.
198. The precise burden the State carries is unclear, this Note argues that it is no less than some
special factors showing that joint custody is not in the best interests of the child, and at most a
showing of harm.
199. See id.
200. See Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1020-22 (N.Y. 1978).
201. See id. at 1021 (stating that when parents come to court and accuse one another of serious
vices and wrongs, an award of joint custody could only increase family chaos).
202. See id. at 1020.
203. See TRIBE, supra note 89, § 16-34, at 1622-24.
204. See supra Part IV.B.
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heightened protection will be analyzed under the intermediate level of
scrutiny.2 5°
Intermediate level scrutiny may be appropriate when neither strict
scrutiny nor rational basis (minimal scrutiny) is entirely appropriate to
the analysis of the right at issue.2" 6 The most common remedy when
employing intermediate scrutiny is to require the court to permit rebuttal
in an individualized hearing. The effect is to transform the irrebuttable
presumptions into "burden-shifting devices.2 0 7 Some scholars have
described the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine as "confused" and
"unhelpful., 20 8 In effect, what they are arguing is that it presumes
nothing and that it "simply chooses one substantive policy over
another. '' 2°9 That argument is based on the premise that when a court
invalidates an irrebuttable presumption, the court is really choosing to
invalidate the presumption as a substantive rule that is overinclusive
Professor Tribe argues that such criticisms miss a very valuable point,
that striking down a rule as overinclusive may suggest that the state is
forbidden from using the factor that lead to the condemnation. 2 ' The
"special feature" of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is that it
suggests that the state is free to use the factor so long as it is not
conclusive.2 2 While there have been many cases where the irrebuttable
presumption doctrine was not employed, thereby suggesting that it has
been rejected or mortally wounded, it serves as a particular intermediate
remedy when it is properly invoked.2 3
In 1975, the Supreme Court decided Weinberger v. Salf,214 wherein
the Court upheld a federal statute that prevented widows from collecting
Social Security survivors' benefits unless their relationship to the
deceased wage earner began at least nine months prior to death.2 5 The
Court reversed the district court ruling, which was based on the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine, because the noncontractual right to
receive financial benefits from the government is not a constitutionally

205. See id. (discussing the Court's reluctance in Troxel v. Granville to articulate the
appropriate standard of review).
206. See TRIBE, supra note 89, § 16-34, at 1618.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1622.
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 1622-24.
214. 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
215. Seeid. at781.
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protected right 2 16 The Court went on to state that to extend the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine to this issue would "turn the doctrine
of [prior] cases into a virtual engine of destruction for countless
legislative judgments .... 21 7 The Court's refusal to extend the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine to the right at stake, however, does not
invalidate its appropriateness as a tool for review.2 8 Rather, the Court
distinguished the right at stake in this case from the rights at stake in
2 where the
Stanley,2 9 and in Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur"
22
irrebuttable presumption doctrine was properly employed. ' The Court
recognized that Stanley and LaFleur involved substantial rights and
liberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and the irrebuttable presumptions presented in those cases
operated as heavy burdens on the ability to exercise those freedoms. 222
The Stanley Court invalidated an irrebuttable presumption that
prevented unwed fathers from being afforded a hearing before their
children were placed up for adoption or in the care of third parties.223 The
principle aim of the statute was to protect the welfare of children,
promote the best interests of the community, and to strengthen family
ties whenever possible.224 The Court recognized that these are legitimate
state interests. 22' But it was not the legitimacy of the state's interest that
was at issue. 221 It was the means by which the state sought to further
these interests that was at issue. 27 The Court observed that the state did
216. See id. at 772 ("[O1f course Congress may not invidiously discriminate among such
claimants on the basis of a 'bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group,' or on
the basis of criteria which bear no rational relation to a legitimate legislative goal.") (citations
omitted).
217. Id.
218. See id. at 771-72 (distinguishing the right at issue in this case from prior decisions where
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine was validly employed).
219. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1975) (holding that unwed fathers cannot
automatically be denied custody).
220. 414 U.S. 632, 642 (1974) (holding invalid school board regulations requiring pregnant
school teachers to take unpaid matemity leave commencing four to five months before the expected
birth).
221. See Weinberger,422 U.S. at 771-72.
222. Seeid.at 771.
223. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656-57 ("Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier
than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative
issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past
formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent and
child. It therefore cannot stand.").
224. See id. at 652.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
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not register any gains towards its legitimate interest by separating
221
children from the custody of fit parents. Instead, the state would spite
its own goals by needlessly separating fit fathers from their children.229
While the State had asserted that most unwed fathers were unfit parents,
the Court found that not all unwed fathers are in this category.230 Some
unwed fathers are wholly suited to custody of their children.2 1' Whether
or not Stanley was suitable could only be determined by a hearing. 2 2 If
he was found to233 be suitable, affording custody to him would further the
state's interest.
The irrebuttable presumption at issue in the context of joint custody
is that joint custody is not in the best interests of children unless both
parents voluntarily and mutually agree upon it. The state's paramount
concern is in championing the best interests of the child.3 As the Court
in Stanley found, these interests are legitimate.233 It is the means chosen
to achieve that interest that is at issue. There is no conclusive evidence
that joint custody is not in the best interests of the child over the
objection of one of the parents.236 While joint custody over the objection
of one of the parents may not be in the best interests of the child all of
the time, there are times when joint custody is appropriate.237 What
legitimate state interest is furthered by defeating joint custody where
joint custody would have been in the best interests of the child? The
state would spite its own aim of championing the best interests of the
child by precluding joint custody when it is best for the children.238
Upon divorce, the state often conducts a custody hearing, wherein
the state could determine whether both parents are fit and capable of
retaining custody. 2 9 The problem exists when the state restricts the
award to an award of sole custody only. 240 The irrebuttable presumption
exists, not because the state denies a hearing, but because the state

228. See id.
229. See id. at 652-53.
230. See id. at 654.
231. See id.
232. See id. at 655.
233. See id.
234. See id. at 652.
235. See id.
236. See supra note 6.
237. See generally The Evolving JudicialRole in Child Custody, supra note 4 (discussing the
benefits of joint custody and parental plans that promote co-parenting).
238. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 653.
239. Presumably the state could utilize the hearing by which it determines sole custody to
determine joint custody.
240. See Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1021-22 (N.Y. 1978).
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refuses to consider an award that would allow both parents to retain their
legal rights to the custody, care and decision making of their children.
This refusal creates the foregone conclusion that one of the parents will
have their decision making rights terminated at the conclusion of the
hearing.
Due process is not satisfied by merely having a hearing-the extent
of procedural due process is influenced by the extent to which a party
might suffer loss. 24' The constitutional rights of parents that have raised
their children warrants deference and protection.242 In a parental rights
termination proceeding, the parents' interest is commanding and requires
the state to support its allegations (usually abuse or neglect) by clear and
convincing evidence. 243 This standard is operable when the state seeks to
permanently and irrevocably terminate the rights of a parent in their
child. 2"4
In a linear framework, 245 this loss can be viewed as the most
draconian and therefore should be placed on the extreme right of the
scale. When the state seeks to intervene into the private realm of a
parent's decision to decide who may visit with the child, the state must
show some deference to the parent's decision about what is in their
children's best interests. 246 The state may not assert that its intrusion is
justified based upon the best interests of the child without some "special
factors" that might justify the state's intervention. 247 Since the right at
stake in Troxel was limited to the parental right to decide which third
parties may visit with their children,245 we could put this right on the
opposite end of the linear scale.
The potential loss of rights to a parent in a custody dispute is equal
to that of a termination proceeding, except the parent will retain the right
to visit with the child. 249 This puts the loss on the linear scale somewhere
between the right to decide who may visit with the children, and a total
termination of all parental rights. That is to say, the state must show at
241. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
242. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 ("The private interest here, that of a man in the children he
has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.").
243. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48.
244. See id.
245. See Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582, 603 n.88 (1983) (stating that a sliding scale
approach analyzes the infringement of fundamental rights as such: The higher the impairment, the
greater the state's interest must be in order to justify the infringement).
246. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 70 (2000).
247. See id. at 68.
248. See id. at 67.
249. See Franz, 707 F.2d at 602.
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least some deference and present some special factors to justify its
intervention;250 and at most, the state might have to prove abuse, neglect
or parental unfitness." ' Assuming, arguendo, the state's burden lies on
the left side of the linear scale, the state would be required to show some
deference and special factors to justify its intrusion prior to a decision
that one of the parents must have their rights terminated. However, the
irrebuttable presumption that sole custody is in the best interests of the
child if both parents cannot agree to joint custody fails to give any
deference to the parent seeking joint custody who may in turn lose their
rights.
The presumption that an award of sole custody is in the best
interests of the child if parents cannot mutually agree to joint custody is
contrary to the longstanding constitutional doctrine: Fit parents are
presumed to act in the best interests of their children.252 This presumption
is a mechanism for placing the initial burden on the state.253 In Troxel,
the Court noted that the initial problem with the Washington Superior
Court was not that it intervened, but rather that it intervened without
giving any "special weight at all" to the parent's decision.2 4 The
Washington Superior Court placed the burden on the parent to disprove
that visitation with the grandparents would be in the best interests of the
children.255 This rationale directly contravened the longstanding
presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of the child.2 6
A state's presumption that sole custody is in the best interests of the
child, unless joint custody is voluntarily agreed to by both parents,
presumes that both parents will not be able to act in the best interests of
the child.257 The fact that both parents do not agree to joint custody
operates as evidence that the parents will not act in the best interests of
the children.25 Often, one of the parents refuses to agree to joint custody
for concrete reasons (i.e., child abuse, ongoing domestic violence, severe

250. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68.
251. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 90, at 1345-46.
252. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68-69 ("[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or her
children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private
realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions
concerning the rearing of that parent's children."); see also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602
(1979).
253. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70.
254. Id. at 69.
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. See Braiman v. Braiman, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1020 (N.Y. 1978).
258. Lack of mutual agreement on a parenting plan would result in the court's intervention.
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substance abuse, mental illness, etc.).259 If these reasons exist, the court
should be able to identify them, and joint custody should not be
ordered.' 6 In some instances, the parents are so embattled in the divorce
they become unable to agree on almost any aspect of the divorce.26'
Often, the reason why couples seek judicial intervention is to solve the
divorce-related stalemate problems so that they can move their lives
along and end the conflict.
Several problems come to light when the presumption of sole
custody arises because both parents are unable to agree to joint custody.
First, the parental problems may be based on mere disagreements that
have escalated as a result of the adversarial nature of divorce; and
therefore the court is relying on a disagreement made in the heat of the
moment as evidence of the parent's inability to co-parent in the future.262
This policy fails to consider that parental disagreements at the time of
divorce can be transitory. 263 Second, it is often the parent most likely to
win sole custody that is the objecting parent.26 In this situation the court
will terminate legal custody of a parent that has not demonstrated any
inability or lack of desire to co-parent. 265 Third, the objecting parent may
be exercising the veto power in a manner that is inconsistent with a
decision made in the best interests of the child (i.e., financial bargaining,
revenge, or other self serving reasons), yet they are subsequently
awarded sole custody of the child, while the non-objecting cooperative
parent would have their rights terminated. 66
While the Supreme Court has noted that the best interest of the
child standard is the appropriate standard for states to utilize in making
custody determinations, 67 the Court has also recognized that there is a
strong presumption that parents act in the best interest of their
children.2 68 A presumption that an award of sole custody is in the best
259. See The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody, supra note 4, at 420.
260. See id.
261. See MNOOKIN, supra note 74, at 176.
262. See Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 72 (N.J. 1981) (stating that the potential ability for
parental cooperation should not be assessed in the "heat of the moment").
263. See id.
264. See Taking Children Seriously, supra note 6, at 715 (arguing that substantive law that
favors sole custody gives the parent most likely to win custody the incentive to withhold agreement
to joint custody in order to receive favorable financial concessions).
265. See id.
266. See id. A parent most likely to win sole custody may have incentives to withhold
agreements to joint custody. See id. If there was a presumption of joint custody, a parent opposing
joint custody would have to go to court where joint custody might still be ordered. See id. at 716.
267. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993) (stating in dicta that the best interests of
the child is an appropriate standard for custody determinations between parents).
268. See Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
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interest of the child when parents cannot voluntarily agree to joint
custody assumes that the lack of agreement is enough to rebut the
presumption that parents will act in the best interests of their children
after divorce.
However, the best interests of the child standard is not without
some mandatory deference to a parent's rights. The best interests of the
child standard will not automatically trump a parent's Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 269 In Palmore v. Sidoti,27 the Supreme Court held
that a state court could not use race or racial biases as factors to consider
when determining the best interests of the child.27' While the Palmore
decision was not decided based on the parent's fundamental liberty
interest in custody of their children, it did recognize that courts must
weigh a parent's constitutional rights when deciding child custody, as
between the parents themselves.272 The court may not automatically
infringe upon a parent's constitutional rights merely because one parent
has asked the court to make a determination of custody of the children
and the state chooses to make such a determination consistent with its
7
right as parenspatriae.2
' Therefore, the Court determined that utilizing
a factor such as race would infringe upon the parent's constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.274
In general, applying the best interests of the child standard can be
problematic. 275 As a result of abandoning the maternal or paternal
presumptions, the courts are faced with a more difficult task of
identifying the parent that best serves the child's interests. 276 This places
an increased burden on the court and results in much greater costs than

The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child
lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's
difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of
affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.
Id.
269. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (holding that a racial classification
cannot justify taking custody away from a natural mother); see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 394 (1979) (holding that it is unconstitutional to permit unmarried mothers but not involved
unmarried fathers of a child a veto power over the child's adoption).
270. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434 (holding that a racial classification cannot justify taking
custody away from a natural mother).
271. See id.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id. at 433.
275. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 6, at 466-69.
276. See id. at 467.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 7

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:547

under the earlier presumptions. 7 It also becomes particularly
troublesome when the court must make a custody determination between
two fit parents.27' Often, the final decision of which parent best serves
the child's needs is influenced by the personal biases and preferences of
the judge.279 The court is forced to make its determination in a predictive
manner which is sometimes reduced to mere speculation of which parent
will serve the child's interests best. 280 Fortunately, there are several
viable alternatives that would better serve the needs of children, while
also respecting parental rights.
VI.

LESS RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO SOLE CUSTODY

The problems with a custody system that prefers sole custody to
promoting cooperative joint parenting are vast. The adversarial nature of
modern day custody litigation tends to produce acrimony between the
parents. 8 Court battles between parents are often bitter battles that pit
the children against the parents and place children in the middle of a
parental war. 82 In order to persuade the court that a particular party
should be awarded sole custody of the children, the parents have an
incentive to introduce very personal and damaging evidence against the
other parent."' Ironically, the parents are expected to communicate
effectively and in the best interests of the child during and following a
284
heated period of litigation. The adversarial nature of sole custody
litigation basically creates a situation where one parent is deemed the
"winner" and the other parent is deemed the "loser. 2 5 The losing parent
sometimes withdraws from the child's life after the litigation.286 Often,
the nature of the losing parent's relationship with the child is reduced to
pure fun and games and not that of a full parent and child relationship. 87

277. See id.
278. See id. at 467 n.54.
279. See id. at 467.
280. See id.
281. See id. at468.
282. See Janet Weinstein, And Never the Twain Shall Meet: The Best Interests of Children and
the Adversary System, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 79, 85 (1997) (stating that proceedings that pit the
children against the parents, and place the children in the middle of parental battles are against the
best interests of the children).
283. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 6, at 468.
284. See id.
285. See Taking Children Seriously, supra note 6, at 709.
286. See id. at 709-10; cf Brinig, supra note 24, at 314 (arguing that awards of joint custody to
fathers do not result in statistical decreases in depression as compared to non-custodial fathers).
287. See Taking Children Seriously, supra note 6, at 710.
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One result of the application of the best interests of the child
standard, in a determination of sole custody, is that predicting the parent
most likely to win such litigation has become difficult. 28 This has the
effect of giving fathers an incentive to seek custody of the children
because they now stand a better chance of winning than they did under
the tender years analysis.2 9 While this is often a choice made with the
best of intentions, this unpredictability can at times result in parents
threatening to seek sole custody of their children in order to coerce a
more favorable distribution of the marital assets.2
There are various alternatives to the harsh results of terminating
parental rights while still protecting the best interests of the child.
Several states already recognize that parents are not always able to coparent at the time of the divorce, yet the courts will still order joint legal
custody.29 ' When parents are unable to effectively communicate,
mediation can be an effective way of resolving disputes between
parents. 92 It is possible for parents to negotiate and mediate their
disputes in a way that benefits the interests of the parents while also
protecting the best interests of the child.2 93 A court should not assume
that parents are able to work out their differences and demonstrate
cooperation during the divorce phase because the adversarial nature of
litigation and even the mere involvement of attorneys can exacerbate the
situation.294
A.

ProposedAlternatives to the Sole Custody Model

The American Law Institute ("ALl") has recently completed its
work on Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, and proposed
reforms to the best interests of the child standard.29 The ALl addresses
all areas of family dissolution. Chapter Two of the proposal deals with
post-divorce and separation parenting plans. The ALl proposal focuses
on promoting parental agreement to parenting plans.
See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 6, at 469.
See id. at 468.
See id.
See Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 71 (N.J. 1981).
See MNOOKIN, supra note 74, at 177.
See id.
See id.
See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.02 (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION]; see also Andrew Schepard, Beyond 'Best Interests': ALI's Child Custody Dispute
Resolution System, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 2002, at 3 [hereinafter ALI's Child Custody Dispute
Resolution].
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
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The ALI proposal conspicuously refers to post-divorce parenting
agreements as "parenting plans" rather than custody arrangements.296 The
proposal requires the court to defer to parental plans submitted to the
court by parents at the time of divorce, unless the plan presents harm to
the child or was unknowingly (or involuntarily) agreed to. Interestingly,
the ALI proposal specifically rejects the term "custody. 297 Since the
term "custody" is not used, neither parent is awarded sole custody and
neither parent is termed the visiting parent.298 The proposal also
recognizes the role that the court plays in helping parents achieve
agreement on parenting plans, by giving courts the discretion to provide
parents with information regarding mediation and educational
programs. 299
In the event parents are unable to agree on a parenting plan, the
court can compare the plans submitted by each parent to see which plan
is more realistic, fair, and best serves the children's needs.3° The court
will then use its discretion to design a parenting plan.3 °' The proposal
would require courts to presume that parental decision making is to be
granted jointly to the parents that have "been exercising a reasonable
share of [the] parenting functions. 30 2 Also, minor day-to-day decision
making is to be made by the parent that is with the child on a particular
day.30 3 This aspect of traditional child custody law has commonly been
referred to as "joint legal custody."3 ' This standard recognizes a parent's
right to decision making and control of their children, by maintaining a

296. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 295, at § 2.05(l).
297. See id. § 2.03 cmt. e.
298. See id.
299. See id. § 2.07 cmt. a-b. The ALl recognizes that "mediation can help parents avoid the
time, expense, and acrimony of litigation. It can also help cultivate a more cooperative attitude
between the parents in matters related to the raising of their children." Id. § 2.07 cmt. b. The ALI
approach empowers the court to take a proactive role in helping parents settle disputes rather than
merely assuming that such disputes are indicia of parents that should not have joint decisionmaking. See id.
300. See id. § 2.09 cmI. a.
301. Id.
302. See id. § 2.09(2). The proposal recognizes exceptions when there is evidence of domestic
violence. See id. The ALl commentary explicitly states that the parent opposing joint decisionmaking carries the burden of proving that joint decision-making is not in the best interests of the
child. See id. § 2.09 cmt. a.
303. See id. § 2.09(3). The ALI proposal does not use the term custody, but the traditional
physical custody determination is handled using an approximation standard. The approximation
standard allocates time that the child will spend with each parent based upon the proportion of time
that the child spent with each parent prior to the divorce or separation. See id. § 2.08(l).
304. See ALI's Child Custody Dispute Resolution, supra note 295, at 3 (stating examples of
decision-making that include: health care, education, and permission to marry).
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30 5
role for each parent in the child's life so long as it is safe to the family.
This standard appears constitutionally consistent with the holding in
Stanley v. Illinois,3 6 whereby a parent's right to custody, care, and
decision making may not automatically be reduced when a parent has
demonstrated a willingness to assume responsibility for his children.3 7
The ALl proposal is not entirely unique; several states require
parents to submit parenting plans in all divorce cases.3 8 Parenting plans
are basically written agreements between parents which detail parenting
309
time, decision making, and the children's residential arrangements.
The State of Washington requires, by statute, that parents submit
parenting plans for all divorce cases involving children.310 This statute
promotes co-parenting and even provides for mandatory settlement
conferences at the court's discretion." Under the Washington statutes,
the court will only order sole decision making when both refuse to agree
to mutual decision making, or one of the parent's has committed some
family domestic abuse or abandoned the child.31 2 Like the ALl proposal,
the Washington statute does not use the term "custody." Rather, the

words "decision-making" and "residential time" are used.313 The court's

default principle to order mutual decision making, when particular
criteria are not met, is analogous to a rebuttable presumption of joint
legal custody. Both parents will share in the decision making and neither
parent will automatically lose their parental rights merely because the
court's assistance was needed to resolve a problem.
In order to help parents settle disputes over contested issues, the
Washington statute allows the court to mandate that the parents attend
mediation. The goal of this mandated mediation is "to reduce acrimony
which may exist between the parties and to develop an agreement
assuring the child's close and continuing contact with both parents after
the marriage is dissolved. 314 The mediation is to be kept confidential
and the mediator is not allowed to testify at any related court

305.
306.
307.
308.

See
405
See
See

id.
U.S. 645 (1972).
id. at 651, 658 (referring to unwed fathers).
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-234(l) (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-401 (2001);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181 (1) (West 1997).
309. See Theresa A. Peterson, Note, The State of Child Custody In Minnesota: Why Minnesota
Should Enact the ParentingPlan Legislation, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1577, 1599 (1999).
310. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.181(1).
311. Seeid. § 26.09.181(5).
312. See id. § 26.09.191(1).
313. Id. § 26.09.191.
314. Id. § 26.09.015(1).
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proceedings." 5 By providing for mediation in order to help parents
resolve disputes, the statute recognizes the need for the state to provide
mechanisms to the family so that both parents may remain integral parts
of the child's life.
The State of California also has a statutory intention to create
parenting plans that are in the best interests of the child.3 6 The language
of the California statute indicates that there is no preference for, nor
presumption of, joint legal custody, joint physical custody, or sole
custody. 37 Rather, the statute states that custody shall be awarded to
parents jointly first, then, if it is not in the best interests of the child for
the parents to have joint custody, to one of the parents solely. 38 The
distinction may appear minor, however, the statute seems to focus on
implementing effective parenting plans that are in the best interests of
the child, rather than on titles of custody. 3 9 In the end, the statute lays
out a formula for how California courts should award custody to the
parents jointly unless it is rebutted by an analysis of the best interests of
the child.
B. Exceptions to the Joint Custody Model
There are times when a parent's right to joint custody must yield to
the best interests of the child. Courts must recognize that high conflict
families need to be carefully screened oUt.312 ' The ALI proposal suggests
that courts should steer parents to mediation and parent education
programs in order to help the parents reach agreement on parenting
plans.322 However, the proposal takes into consideration that some
parents should not meet face-to-face.323 When domestic violence has
been shown, the court should place limits on parental contact in order to
protect the parent from harm. 32 4 This is not a 'problem for parent
education programs because most do not require face-to-face meetings

315. See id. § 26.09.015(3).
316. See CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3040 (Supp. 2002).
317. See id.
318. See id.
319. See id. (avoiding the use of the words 'solely" and "jointly").
320. See id.
321. See The Evolving Judicial Role in Child Custody, supra note 4, at 396 (stating that highconflict families can be defined as those involving repeated relitigation, family violence, child
abduction, mental illness, or drug or substance abuse).
322. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 295, § 2.07(1).
323. See id. § 2.07(3).
324. See id. § 2.07(2)-(3).
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between the parents. Mediation on the other hand does rely on face-toface meetings.""
The ALl proposal might be too restrictive in terms of limiting faceto-face meetings between parents when there has been a showing of
domestic violence.3 26 Limiting face-to-face meetings, and thereby
precluding mediation, may have the effect of further disempowering
victims of domestic violence. This approach may be more conservative
than it needs to be. The Model Standards of Practicefor Divorce and
Family Mediatorstakes a less restrictive approach to mediation between
parents when domestic violence has been shown.327 These standards
provide for safety precautions to protect victims of domestic violence.328
They also require mediators to recognize that not all parental disputes
involving domestic violence are appropriate for mediation.329 This
methodology does not totally preclude mediation when domestic
violence is present; rather, it proposes to handle domestic violence on a
case-by-case basis.33° While domestic violence is a significant factor to
consider when determining whether or not joint decision making is
appropriate, it is not altogether dispositive.
The Washington State approach to presuming joint decision making
is also not absolute. The statute states that the "permanent parenting plan
,33When a
shall not [always] require mutual decision-making ....
parent willfully abandons his parental responsibility for an extended
period of time or substantially refuses to perform his parenting
functions, the parenting plan might not require joint decision making.332
This approach seems to be consistent with the holding in Stanley v.
Illinois.333 In Stanley, the Court held that a court must afford deference to
an unwed father's rights when he has demonstrated a willingness to
assume responsibility for his children. 334 The Washington statute
carefully provides language that would appear to be consistent with a

325. See MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATORS Standard
X, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 110, 119 (2000).
326. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 295, § 2.07(3).
327. See MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATORS, supra
note 325, Standard XI.
328. See id. at (D).
329. See id. at (C).
330. See id.
331. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191(1) (2002).
332. See id.
333. 405 U.S. 645,649 (1972).
334. See id. at 651.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

37

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 7

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:547

parent's failure to assume parental responsibility, thereby allowing the
state to defeat that parent's right to joint decision making.335
The statute also provides an exception to joint decision making
when a parent has engaged in various forms of domestic violence, abuse
to the child, or fear of grievous bodily harm to the child.336 The state's

right as parens patriae allows the state to terminate a parent's rights
when that parent has been shown to be unfit.337

The California statute, which provides for a preference of joint
custody first, has a safeguard measure built in that gives the custody
court the right to review voluntarily submitted parenting plans to ensure
they are in the best interests of the child before being so ordered. 38 The
best interests of the child standard in California requires the court to
consider several factors, including abuse against the child or the other
parent.339 Allegations of abuse need substantial independent
corroboration, and if established, will result in the abusive parent's
disqualification.3 ° When allegations of abuse are made, the court is
required to state in writing or in the court record its reasons for making
the appropriate custody determinations. Using the best interests of the
child standard, which includes specific factors, the court may then rebut
the initial preference for joint custody and order sole custody to either
342
parent.
While all of these proposed "less restrictive alternatives" provide
for joint decision making between parents after divorce, they also
recognize that there are situations when it would just be inappropriate to
order joint decision making between the parents. Each of them mandates
that before sole custody can be ordered, the court must first rebut the
presumption that parents are to be granted joint decision making.

335. See WASH.REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191(l)(a). Procedural due process requires a hearing
on when to rebut a presumption of unfitness when a parent has demonstrated a willingness to
assume responsibility for their children. See Stanley, 405 U.S. at 657-58.
336. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.191(b)-(c).
337. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 767 n.17 (1982) ("Any parens patriae interest in
terminating the natural parents' rights arises only at the dispositional phase, after the parents have
been found unfit.").
338. See CAL. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3040 (Supp. 2002).
339. See id. § 3011 (West 2000). The court is also required to consider parental substance
abuse. See id.
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See id. § 3040
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VII.

CONCLUSION

A requirement that states grant joint custody to parents can be
properly inferred from prior cases determining that parents have a
fundamental right to custody, care, and decision making of their
children. Before a state can intervene and defeat a parent's fights, there
must first be at the very least a showing of some "special factors"3 43 that
warrant such intervention. 344 Defining those special factors might be
difficult, but at most a showing of harm to the child would suffice.345
When a state presumes that sole custody is the only reasonable solution
to parental litigation, the state fails to adequately protect the
constitutional rights of parents.
Parental conflict is often enhanced by the adversary nature of child
custody litigation. In order to protect the best interests of children and to
protect the rights of parents, child custody courts must realize that
parental conflict "ebbs and flows over time. 34 6 The role of the child
custody court must be more than declaring the family dead.347 It needs to
be a facilitator of the reorganization of the family. Moreover, courts
need to recognize that it is in the best interests of the children of this
nation to preserve family bonds when parents are willing and capable of
assuming responsibility for their parenting roles. The Constitution
commands it.
James W. Bozzomo*

343. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000).
344. See supra Part V.
345. See id.
346. The Evolving JudicialRole in Child Custody, supra note 4, at 407.
347. See id.
* This Note is dedicated to my wife, Catherine, and to my amazing children, Briana,
Daniella, and Alexa. Their love and patience have enabled me to strive for all my goals. I would
also like to thank Professor Andrew Schepard of the Hofstra University School of Law-his
dedication and concern for the best interests of children is inspiring and serves as a model for all
aspiring family law practitioners. His guidance was instrumental to the success of this Note. I would
like to also thank Professor Eric Freedman, of the Hofstra University School of Law School, for
providing essential wisdom regarding constitutional doctrine. As well, I would like to thank the
entire membership of the Hofstra Law Review.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 7

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss2/7

40

